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The Extraterritorial Scope of NEPA's Environmental Impact
Statement Requirement
Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA) 1 in response to the growing public concern about present
and potential environmental problems. The Act was intended "[t]o
declare a national policy which [would] encourage productive and
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote
efforts which [would] prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man;
to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on
Environmental Quality." 2 Section 102(2),3 the "action forcing'' 4
provision of NEPA, requires all federal agencies to implement certain procedures in their decision-making process. The environmental impact statement requirement of section 102(2)(C) is the most
significant of these procedures and has been the basis of most NEPA
litigation. 5 Section 102 directs that "to the fullest extent possible
. . . (2) all agencies of the Federal government shall . . . (C)
include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the
1. 42 u.s.c. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
2. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
3. 42 u.s.c. § 4332(2) (1970).
4. See S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1969); Environmental
Defense Fund v. Corps of Engrs., 470 F.2d 289, 297-98 (8th Cir. 1972); Anderson,
The National Environmental Policy Act, in ENVmONMENTAL LAw INSTITUTE,
FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 238, 239 (1974).
5. Courts have construed section 102(2) (C) to be sufficiently specific to be the
basis of a cause of action, see F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN TIIE COURTS 15-23 (1973),
and have been very liberal in granting standing, see id. at 26-44. See generally
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
U.S. 669, 683-90 (1973).
In a suit against a federal agency acting abroad, there are several possible theories
upon which standing might be based. First, a United States plaintiff could argue that
he has in some way directly suffered injury in fact due to a federal action abroad. Cf.
Sierra Club v. Coleman, Civ. No. 75-1040, mem. at 4 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 1975).
Second, a plaintiff could argue that he has a right under NEPA to be informed by,
and be able to comment on, impact statements on federal action anywhere. Cf.
Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1087 n.29 (D.C.
Cir. 1973). Finally, there is support for the proposition that NEPA gives foreigners
who would suffer "injury in fact" a right to sue. See Wilderness Soc. v. Morton, 463
F.2d 1261 (1972) (Canadian citizen and Canadian environmental group allowed to
intervene in NEPA action); People of Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811, 820 n.14
(D. Hawaii 1973) (granting standing to nonresident aliens living in U.S. trust
territory).
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responsible official on [the environmental impact and other environmental considerations of the proposed action]." 6
Although it is clear that section 102(2) applies to federal activities within the United States, several agencies have argued that
NEPA does not apply to their international activities. While
some have subsequently promulgated regulations that do not exempt
these international activities from NEPA's procedures, 7 at least four
agencies that are involved in extensive activities abroad wit•h great
potential for environmental impact-the Defense Department, the
Agency for International Development (AID), the Export-Import
Bank (Eximbank), and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)-refuse to comply with the requirements of section
102(2)(C) with regard to their international activities. 8 To date,
6. The complete list of the matters on which the impact statement is to comment
is as follows:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and
the maintenance and enhancement of Jong-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would
be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)
(1970). Section 102(2)(C) continues:
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction
by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved.
Copies of such statement and the comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards, shall be made available to the President, the Council on
Environmental Quality and to the public . . . , and shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency review processes.
7. Agencies that have apparently acquiesced in the application of NEPA procedures to activities outside the United States include the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, see 38 Fed. Reg. 6321 (1973), the Coast Guard, see 38 Fed. Reg.
34,135-46 (1973), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, see 14 C.F.R.
§ 1204.1103 (1975), and the Department of State, see 37 Fed. Reg. 19,167-68 (1972).
The State Department position, however, is not shared by the Agency for International Development (AID), an independent agency within the State Department.
8. "For major significant Defense actions conducted in, or partly in, areas which
are in or under the jurisdiction of a nation other than the United States," the Defense
Department requires the responsible unit to provide the Assistant Secretary of
Defense "with a recommendation as to whether or not a statement should bo
prepared, reasons for the recommendation, and an evaluation of the effect of a
statement on U.S. foreign relations." 32 C.F.R. § 214.6(b)(1) (1975). Although
the standards to be used in this recommendation are not articulated, the regulation
appears to leave room for discretionary decisions to omit the preparation of NEPA
impact statements in situations in which the proper functioning of the Department is
not so irreconcilably in conflict with NEPA procedural requirements as to mandate
an exception to those requirements. Compare text at and following note 141. By
contrast, the regulations originally proposed by the Department did not confer such
discretion. They stated that, except for combat or combat-related activities, "environmental statements are required for actions [of environmental significance] conducted
anywhere in the world, if they are major and significant." 38 Fed. Reg. 31,647
(1972).
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no court has directly confronted the issue of the applicability of
NEPA procedures to the international activities of these and other
federal agencies. 9
·
AID is an independent agency within the Department of State established to
provide assistance to developing countries in the form of capital projects and technical
assistance. In addition to assisting in land alteration and industrial development
projects, AID finances agricultural activities involving pesticides, chemical fertilizers,
fungicides, and herbicides that have potential for serious environmental side effects. It
has been argued on behalf of AID that NEPA does not apply to actions occurring
within the territorial jurisdiction of another state. See Administration of the National Environmental Policy Act, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and
Wildlife Conservation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 546 (1970) (memorandum of C. Herter, Special Assistant to
the Secretary of State for Environmental Affairs) [hereinafter Oversight Hearings].
Although AID is aware of the need for environmental protection, and has since
adopted internal procedures requiring consideration of environmental factors in order
"[t]o implement A.I.D.'s policy to conform with the intent and objectives of
[NEPA]," 37 Fed. Reg. 22,686 (1972), the procedures do not fully satisfy NEPA
requirements. There is no provision for the preparation and distribution of a draft
environmental impact statement for comment by other agencies and the public.
Instead, only the release of a final impact statement at a late stage in the decisionmaking process is required.
Eximbank is primarily involved with providing financing for foreign borrowers
wishing to purchase American goods, including nuclear power plants, oil rigs, and
other equipment with the potential for significantly altering the environment. Notwithstanding these dangers, Eximbank has no environmental regulations and maintains that it is exempt from NEPA. See Eximbank's Opposition to Plaintiff's Cross
Motion for Summary Judgment at 3-11, Sierra Club v. AEC, 4 ENv. L. REP. 20,685
(D.D.C. Aug. 3, 1974) [hereinafter Eximbank's Opposition].
OPIC is a federally owned corporation that insures and guarantees foreign
investments. Although OPIC has adopted environmental guidelines that provide for
the evaluation of environmental effects of OPIC-supported projects, the applicant, not
the agency, prepares the impact statement, and there is no provision for review by
other agencies or the public. See Overseas Private Investment Corp., General Policy
and Guidelines, Eligibility of Projects, Environmental Considerations, No. 5.101, Oct.
26, 1971.
9. In Sierra Club v. Coleman, Civ. No. 75-1040 (D.D.C. Oct. 7, 1975), a
preliminary injunction was issued against the Department of Transportation and the
Federal Highway Administration. Because of their failure to comply fully with the
procedural requirements of NEPA, these agencies were prohibited from further
participation in the construction of the Darien Gap Highway in Panama and
Colombia. However, in granting the injunction, the court did not discuss whether
NEPA applies to the extraterritorial activities of federal agencies because the defendants did not maintain that their activities were exempt from NEPA. Rather, they
contended that their environmental assessments satisfied the procedural requirements
of the Act.
In People of Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811 (D. Hawaii 1973), NEPA was
construed to apply to Trust Territories of the United States-broader questions of
extraterritorial jurisdiction were not reached. See text at notes 110-15 infra. The
issue whether NEPA applies to federal activities abroad was more directly raised in
Sierra Club v. AEC, 4 ENv. L. REP. 20,685 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 1974), in which
plaintiffs requested the AEC, the Department of State, and Eximbank to prepare an
impact statement with regard to the nuclear power plant export program. Prior to
judgment, however, the AEC (now ERDA) agreed to prepare an impact statement,
and the court declined to rule on the applicability of NEPA to Eximbank. Significantly, however, ERDA's draft impact statement, see Comment, International Application of NEPA: Environmentalists Challenge Pesticide Aid Program, 5 ENv. L. REP.
10,086 (1975), and decision to continue nuclear power export activities during the
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This Note analyzes the extent to which NEPA's section 102(2)
procedural requirements, specifically the impact statement requirement of section 102(2) (C), apply to federal agencies in their activities abroad. After determining that Congress does possess the
authority to extend the requirements of NEPA to all federal agency
actions, and that legislative intent will thus control the territorial
scope of these requirements, consideration will be given to the
presumption against the extraterritorial application of congressional
enactments. It will be concluded that a "clear statement" of congressional intent is not required in the case of NEPA and that the
scope of the Act should be determined by considering all relevant
manifestations of congressional intent. This Note will therefore
analyze NEPA's language and legislative history and the policy considerations relevant to extraterritorial application of the impact statement requirement and, on the basis of this analysis, conclude that
the NEPA procedural requirements apply to federal activities anywhere in the world.
I. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY
In determining the territorial scope of NEPA's procedural
requirements, the threshold issue that must be confronted is the extent of congressional authority. The first consideration is whether
international law would restrict congressional power. 10 In Steele v.
Bulova Watch Co., 11 in which a United States trademark infringement act was extended to a United States citizen in Mexico, the
S~preme Court articulated the general rule: "'[T]he United States
is not debarred by any rule of international law from governing the
conduct of its own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign
countries when the rights of other nations or their nationals are not
infringed.' " 12 NEPA procedures are directed only to federal agencies and would not affect actions taken by either foreign nations or
their citizens. Moreover, neither the denial of United States assistance nor the imposition of conditions on assistance would appear to
be an infringement upon foreign sovereignty. i:i Thus, no violation
period of preparation of the final impact statement, 40 Fed. Reg. 45,463-64 (1975),
considered only the adverse environmental impacts in the United States and on the
high seas. Both failed to address the environmental impacts within other countries.
Recently, several environmental organizations have sought to require an analysis of
the supply of pesticides by AID to foreign countries. Environmental Defense Fund v.
AID, Civ. No. 75-0500 (D.D.C., filed April 8, 1975), discussed in Comment, supra.
10. In one sense, international law cannot "restrict" congressional authority: Even
if Congress legislates beyond its international "authority," United States courts would
enforce such laws. See text at note 26 infra.
11. 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
12. 344 U.S. at 285-86, quoting Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941).
13. The NEPA procedures will often have the effect of imposing some burdens
(gathering and providing information is an obvious example) on other parties
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of established principles of international law would result from the
application of NEPA's procedural requirements to the international
activities of federal agencies.
A second factor that could limit congressional authority to apply
NEPA's procedures to activities abroad is the possibility of an unconstitutional infringement on the foreign-policy power of the executive
branch. The extent of congressional power in the foreign-policy
field remains an open question. The views range from exclusive
executive power to determine foreign policy14 to recognition of concurrent power in Congress. 15 However, even proponents of the former view recognize that Congress possesses substantial authority
over the operating procedures of federal agencies abroad. 16 Thi§
recognition probably results from the fact that such matters directly
concern only the agencies themselves and are not really foreignpolicy determinations at all.
Section 102(2)'s procedural requirements clearly fall within the
bounds of this congressional authority. Although agencies must
comply with this section "to the fullest extent possible," the section
is clearly procedural; it does not require that particular substantive
decisions be reached. 17 Even section 102(2)(C) requires only a
detailed investigation and report on, and a good faith consideration
of, possible environmental impacts.18 These procedures could only
influence foreign policy by ensuring_ that environmental factors releinvolved in a project if an adequate impact statement is to be prepared. However,
these burdens are often mere conditions on American assistance or cooperation;
foreign nations and their nationals may freely choose to facilitate preparation of the
impact statement or to refuse, with the result that, in some cases, they may lose
American aid or cooperation. However, "this country may properly impose conditions upon the granting of unilateral aid to any country, and if it chooses to
consider environmental implications in the definition of these conditions, no one can
legitimately object to them." H.R. REP. No. 92-316, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1971).
14. See, e.g., Wallace, The President's Exclusive Foreign Affairs Power over
Foreign Aid: Part I, 1970 DUKE L.J. 293, 320-22.
15. See generally Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71
MICH. L. REv. 1 (1972).
16. See, e.g., Wallace, supra note 14, at 305-08.
17. The only section 102(2) procedure that could arguably be a substantive
foreign-policy directive is section 102(2) (E), which directs agencies to support
international cooperation toward environmental protection where consistent with
United States foreign policy. Because of the qualification, however, the section could
not infringe on executive foreign-policy power.
Of course, to the extent section 102(1) requires agencies to act in accordance with
the declaration of policy set forth in section 101, section 102 can be seen as having
substantive content. See Note, Tlze Least Adverse Alternative Approach to Substantive Review Under NEPA, 88 HARV. L. REv. 735, 739 (1975). Even so, it is at least
clear that section 102 has no substantive content independent of section 101. See
generally Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114-15 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
18. See generally Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109,
1113-15 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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vant to federal activities abroad are fully considered.10 Surely this
would not constitute an unconstitutional infringement upon the
foreign-policy power of the executive branch.
It is possible that the foreign-policy power of the executive
could preclude a similar territorial extension of the substantive
environmental policy of NEPA as articulated in section 101.20
NEPA has been interpreted to require that the ultimate agency decision not be in arbitrary and capricious disregard of environmental
considerations. 21 Although this test allows substantial agency discretion, it creates the potential for interference with the executive foreign-policy power if the section 101 statement of policy is interpreted
as applying to federal agencies worldwide. However, because
section lOl(b) is qualified by the phrase "consistent with other
essential considerations of national policy," and since it seems certain that an executive foreign-policy determination would be included in this category, agency decisions based on foreign-policy
considerations would never be found to be in arbitrary and capricious
disregard of the section lOl(b) policy declaration, as courts would
be loath to second-guess foreign-policy judgments. Thus even the
substantive mandate of NEPA would not interfere with foreignpolicy decisions.

II.

THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY

Since Congress has the authority to extend NEPA to the extraterritorial actions of federal agencies, congressional intent will be
determinative of the Act's scope. Generally, legislative intent must
be ascertained by an examination of several factors, including statutory language, legislative history, and the policies underlying the act
in question. There is, however, a well-established canon of statutory construction that, in the absence of clear statutory language or
legislative history, congressional enactments should be presumed not
to have extraterritorial application. 22 Thus, it has been argued that
19. It has been argued that the application of NEPA procedures to federal
agencies abroad would necessarily have a more direct influence on foreign policy
because the procedures would cause a material disruption in international negotiations. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion of Defendant Export-Import Bank of The United States for Summary Judgment at 20-22, Sierra
Club v. AEC, 4 ENV. L. REP. 20,685 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 1974) [hereinafter Eximbank
Memorandum]. For evaluation of this argument, see text at notes 126-41 infra.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970). It is not settled whether NEPA contains a
substantive mandate or is merely procedural, although the trend is clearly toward
inferring a substantive mandate. See, e.g., Note, supra note 17, at 736-40.
21. See Environmental Defense Fund v. COfPS of Engrs., 470 F.2d 289, 297-300
(8th Cir. 1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 111315 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
22. "Rules of United States statutory law . . . apply only to conduct occurring
within, or having effect within the territory of the United States, unless the contrary
is clearly indicated by the statute." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TI-IE FOREIGN
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Congress should be presumed to have intended NEPA to be limited
to the United States since neither the statutory language nor the
legislative history clearly require extraterritorial application of the
section 102(2) procedures. 23
The presumption against extraterritoriality derives from judicial
recognition of two considerations: First, Congress is primarily concerned with domestic conditions and therefore probably intends
legislation to apply only within the United States. 24 Second, Congress does not ordinarily intend to enact laws that contravene basic
concepts of international law.25
A review of the numerous cases that -have considered the issue
of extraterritorial application of federal laws demonstrates that it is
the second consideration upon which the courts focus. It is clear
that, notwithstanding the constraints of international law, once a court
determines that Congress intended a statute to have extraterritorial
application, it "would be bound to follow Congressional direction
unless this would violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment."26 Thus, where extraterritorial application of a federal act
would transgress accepted principles of international law, courts
apply the presumption and will not infer congressional intent to extend the scope of the statute unless such intent is clearly indicated. 21
An example is the early case of American Banana Co. v. United
States Fruit Co., 28 in which an alleged violation of United States antitrust laws was based upon the acts of a foreign government within
its own territory. There, the Supreme Court refused, in the absence
of a clear statement of extraterritorial scope, to infer congressional
intent to extend the statutes to such conduct because enforcement
would have interfered with the exercise of foreign sovereignty.
Similarly, in Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 20 the Court refused to give extraRELATIONS LAW OF THE UNIT.ED STATES § 38 (1965). The Restatement's explicit
exception to the rule that extraterritorial applicability be clearly expressed parallels a
principle of international law that is well-recognized: "[I]t is settled law . . . that
any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for
conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state
reprehends •..." United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443
(2d Cir. 1945). There is no apparent reason why extraterritorial application need be
"clearly indicated" in other instances in which such application would not contravene
any principle of international law. See text following note 33 infra.
23. See, e.g., Eximbank Memorandum, supra note 19, at 29-30.
24. ~ee Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
25. See Lauritzen v. Larson, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953); Foley Bros. v. Filardo,
336 U.S. 281, 292 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
26. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d
Cir. 1972) (dictum).
27. See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334
(2d Cir. 1972).
28. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
29. 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
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territorial effect to the Eight Hour Law, a labor statute applying to
"[e]very contract made to which the United States . . . is a party." 30
Recognizing that extraterritorial application of the statute would have
"extend[ed] its coverage beyond places over which the United
States has sovereignty or has some measure of legislative control," 31
the court stated: "An intention so to regulate labor conditions which
are the primary concern of a foreign country should not be attributed
to Congress in the absence of a clearly expressed purpose."32 Significantly, although the Court applied the presumption against extraterritorial application, in ascertaining whether Congress had clearly
intended such an extension, it examined not only the statutory language, but also the statute's legislative history and administrative
interpretation. 33
It is implicit in the Foley decision that, if extraterritorial
application of a statute would not infringe on the sovereignty of a
foreign state, the Court would ,not require the same "clearly expressed purpose" to extend the act's scope. This implication is consistent with the fact that, in such a situation, the second consideration
underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality is no longer a
relevant indication of congressional intent. Where this second consideration_ is not applicable, the presumption against extraterritoriality is
supported only by the first consideration-that Congress is primarily
concerned with domestic conditions and therefore probably intends
its enactments to apply only within the United States. It is submitted
that this consideration is not sufficient to override a determination
that, whether or not there is a clear expression, Congress actually
intended a particular statute to have extraterritorial scope. Thus,
this first consideration alone would merely require the party advocating extraterritoriality to sustain the burden of proof that Congress
did in fact intend the law to have extraterritorial application.
This conclusion finds support in the line of cases that have
inferred congressional intent to legislate extraterritorially where such
a construction did not transgress principles of international law. In
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co. 34 and United States v. Bowman,36 no
question of interference with either foreign sovereignty or foreign
nationals was involved. In both cases, the Supreme Court considered the policy implications of extraterritorial application of the statutes in issue and concluded, on that basis, that Congress intended
§

30. 40 U.S.C. § 324 (1948), repealed, Act of Aug. 13, 1962, Pub. L No. 87-581,
203, 76 Stat. 360.
31. 336 U.S. at 285.
32. 336 U.S. at 286.
33. See 336 U.S. at 285-90.
34. 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
35. 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
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the laws to have extraterritorial scope. In neither case did the Court
require a clear statement of congressional intent. In Leasco Data
Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 36 the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit applied section 1O(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act37 to foreign securities transactions consummated outside the
United States. The court determined that the presumption "that,
absent the clearest language, Congress will not be assumed to have
meant to go beyond the limits recognized by foreign relations law"38
was inapplicable because the fraudulent acts alleged to have been
performed in the United States were sufficient to confer regulatory
authority on Congress. On the basis of this determination, the court
examined the legislative history and policies of the Exchange Act
and concluded: "[W]e must ask ourselves whether, if Congress had
thought about the point, it would not have wished to protect an
American investor if a foreigner comes to the United States and
fraudulently induces him to purchase foreign securities abroad-a
purpose which its words can fairly be held to embrace." 39 Finally,
in People of Saipan v. Department of Interior, 40 the district court
considered the application of NEPA to the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands.41 Since this territory, though outside the territorial
United States, is subject to the authority of the United States, no
issues of international law were involved. 42 Nevertheless, the
defendants argued "that because there is no specific language in
NEPA extending the statute's coverage to the Trust Territory, th[e]
court must restrict its application to the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States." 43 The court rejected the application of such a
"mechanical rule" and concluded that a consideration of "all available evidence of legislative intent" was sufficient to support the conclusion that Congress intended to extend NEPA's scope to the territory in issue. 44
As previously indicated, the extraterritorial application of NEPA
would not transgress accepted principles of international law since
the imposition of its procedures on federal agencies abroad would
36. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
38. 468 F.2d at 1334.
39. 468 F.2d at 1337.
40. 356 F. Supp. 645 (D. Hawaii 1973 ), modified on other grounds sub nom.
People of Saipan ex rel. Guerrero v. United States, 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975).
41. The application of NEPA to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands bad
previously been considered in People of Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811 (D.
Hawaii 1973), although the court did not explicitly consider the presumption against
extraterritorial application.
42. See People of Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811, 818 (D. Hawaii 1973).
43. 356 F. Supp. at 649.
44. 356 F. Supp. at 650.
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not infringe on either foreign sovereignty or the rights of foreign
nationals. Thus, a court should not require a "clear indication" of
legislative intent in order to apply the Act to the extraterritorial
activities of federal agencies. Rather, as in Leasco, a court should
consider all the relevant manifestations of congressional intent to
determine "whether, if Congress had thought about the point, it
would have wished to" extend the scope of NEPA's procedural
mandate.
ill.

A.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Section 102(2)-The Inclusiveness
of "All Agencies"

An initial issue in determining the territorial scope of NEPA's
section 102(2) requirements is whether Congress intended "all
agencies of the Federal Government" to mean all agencies anywhere
in the world. The phrase is unqualified and its clear and natural
meaning is that every federal agency, regardless of the locus of its
activities, was intended to be included. The issue of particular
agency exemptions was specifically considered by the conference
committee45 when it added the phrase "to the fullest extent possible"
to section 102: "The purpose of the new language is to make it clear
that each agency of the Federal Government shall comply with the
directives set out in such subparagraphs [ (A) through (H)] unless
the existing law applicable to such agency's operations expressly prohibits or makes full compliance with one of the directives impossible.
. . . [N]o agency shall utilize an excessively narrow construction of
existing statutory authorizations to avoid compliance." 46
The courts have followed this interpretation and have strictly
construed the "all agencies" provision of section 102. 47 Several temporary agencies have been exempted from NEPA procedures in
specific situations on the ground that, since compliance would have
been impossible, Congress must have intended their exemption. 48
45. NEPA is derived from a combination of bills passed concurrently in the
House and Senate. When the Senate submitted its bill to the House for ratification,
the House struck out the entire content and substituted its own bill. Following
congressional procedure, both bills went to a joint House-Senate conference committee, from which NEPA in its final form emerged. See note 81 infra.
46. H.R. REP. No. 91-765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1969) [hereinafter
Conference Report].
41. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114-15
(D.C. Cir. 1971). See generally F. ANDERSON, supra note 5, at 49-55.
Section 104 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4334 (1970), which may exempt agencies
from some NEPA requirements in order to avoid conflict with more specific environmental protection statutes, see F. ANDERSON, supra, at 108-22, will rarely, if ever, be
relevant to extraterritorial actions.
48. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Simon, 373 F. Supp. 1102 (D.D.C. 1974); Cohen v.
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These exemptions, however, have all been consistent with the conference committee's expressed intention to exempt agencies in situations where NEPA's requirements would conflict with their other
statutory duties.
The cases dealing with the application of NEPA procedures to
domestic military activities further buttress this interpretation. Although at times the judiciary has displayed a reluctance to apply
NEPA fully to the military, 49 it is clear that no over-all military exemption exists. 00 In Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 51 a NEPA case involving the controversial nuclear test on
Amchitka Island in Alaska, the court of appeals clearly believed that
the NEPA procedures were applicable to the test, 52 although it refrained from issuing an injunction due to national security considerations. 53 Similarly, in People of Enewetak v. Laird, 54 the district
court, without even considering a blanket exemption on national
security grounds, applied the impact statement requirement to
simulated nuclear explosions by the military. Thus, even the military must comply with section 102(2) "to the fullest extent possible";
exemptions would only be appropriate in specific situations where
compliance with the impact statement requirement is impossible.
Price Commn., 337 F. Supp. 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). These cases rest more on the
necessity for expeditious action inherent in the agency's mandate than on the
"temporary" quality of the agency itself. See text at notes 133-41 infra.
49. For example, in McQuery v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1971), the court
dismissed a challenge to the storage of chemical and biological warfare agents at the
Rocky Mountain arsenal for lack of jurisdiction. The court noted that "[p]ublic
disclosure relating to military-defense facilities creates serious problems involving
national security," and held that NEPA did not create any substantive rights to
challenge the arsenal: "In its proprietary military capacity, the Federal Government
has traditionally exercised unfettered control with respect to internal management and
operation of federal military establishments." 449 F.2d at 612. The complaint,
however, apparently did not allege any violations of section 102 or request an impact
statement, see 449 F.2d at 609, and the court disclaimed any "inten[t] to imply that
the federal officers and agencies charged with the administration and operation of
arsenals are exempt from [NEPA]," 449 F.2d at 612. See also Nielson v. Seaborg,
348 F. Supp. 1369, 1373-74 (D. Utah 1972) (NEPA violations not squarely raised by
the complaint; dictum that AEC's discretionary weighing of environmental against
national security considerations not reviewable); Citizens for Reid State Park v.
Laird, 356 F. Supp. 783 (D. Me. 1972) (no impact statement required since mock
amphibious invasion of state park would not "significantly" affect "the quality of the
human environment" within the meaning of section 102).
50. The Defense Department has apparently acquiesced in this conclusion. See
32 C.F.R. § 214.6 (1975).
51. 463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir.) (reversing summary judgment for AEC), 463 F.2d
789 (D.C. Cir.) (affirming discovery order), 463 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir.) (refusing to
reverse denial of preliminary injunction and to order withholding of certain documents from discovery), application for injunction in aid of jurisdiction denied sub
nom. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Schlesinger, 404 U.S. 917 (1971).
52. See 463 F.2d at 785.
53. 463 F.2d at 798.
54. 353 F. Supp. 811 (D. Hawaii 1973).
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Furthermore, there are some specific indications that Congress
intended to extend NEPA's procedures to federal agencies abroad.
Section 102(2)(E)55 requires "all agencies" to "recognize the
worldwide and long-range character of environmental problems and,
where consistent with the foreign policy of the United States, lend
appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed
to maximize international cooperation in anticipating and preventing
a decline in the quality of mankind's world environment . . . ." The
Senate report specifically states that "all agencies of the Federal Government which have international responsibilities" shall carry out this
directive. r; 6 Because the "all agencies" term applies to section
102(2) as a whole, and not merely to section 102(2)(E), agencies
with "international responsibilities" should have to comply with all
section 102(2) procedures, including the impact statement requirement.
B.

Section 102(2J(C)-The Scope of "Human Environment"

Once it is determined that "all agencies" includes federal
agencies abroad and that, as a result, these agencies must comply
with the section 102(2)(C) impact statement requirement, consideration must be given to what section 102(2)(C) requires. Specifically, it must be determined whether it requires federal agencies to
prepare impact statements for actions that have significant environmental consequences solely outside the United States.
Section 102(2)(C) requires "all agencies of the Federal Government" to prepare environmental impact statements for "major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment." 57 The fundamental issue in construing this provision
is whether Congress intended the phrase "human environment" to
mean the environment of the world or only the environment of the
United States.

1. Statutory Language
The phrase "human environment" is not self-defining; it cannot
be inferred that simply because Congress used "human environment," rather than "national environment," it intended section
102(2)(C) to apply to the worldwide environment. It seems clear
that Congress utilized the former phrase to ensure that environmental consequences would be viewed from the human perspective
rather than solely from an objective physical perspective.r. 8 In intro55. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E) (1970).
56. S. REP. No. 91-296, supra note 4, at 21.
57. (Emphasis added.) Section 102(2) (C) is set out at note 6 supra and
accompanying text.
58. Thus an eyesore, perhaps unobjectionable when viewed from a purely physical
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ducing the conference committee report on NEPA to the Senate,
Senator Jackson stated:
An environmental policy is a policy for people. Its primary concern is with man and his future. The basic principle of the policy
is that we must strive in all that we do to achieve a standard of
excellence in man's relationships to his physical surroundings. If
there are to be departures from this standard of excellence they
should be exceptions to the rule and the policy. And as exceptions,
they will have to be justified in the light of public scrutiny as required
by section 102.59

Similarly, Dr. Lynton K. Caldwell, the originator of the concept of
an impact statement requirement, 60 noted in the Senate hearings:
"[W]hen we speak of the environment, basically, we are talking
about the relationship between man and these physical and biological and social forces that impact upon him. A public policy for the
environment basically is not a public policy for those things out there.
It is a policy for people." 01 Thus, the phrase "human environment"
only indicates the type of effects intended to be included; no conclusion can be drawn from this language about the section's intended
territorial scope.
Although section 102(2) (C)'s language is unilluminating,
support for the inference that "human environment" was intended
to encompass the worldwide environment can be gleaned from the
rest of NEPA. Since section 102(2)(E) is the one section where
Congress specifically expressed its concern for the worldwide environment, it is the most appropriate starting-point for such an
analysis. The first clause of this section directs federal agencies to
"recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmental
problems." Although clearly indicating that Congress recognized
the international dimensions of environmental protection, section
102(2)(E) is ambiguous with regard to whether the "recognition"
directive was intended to apply to the implementation of all the section 102(2) procedures or only to the second mandate of section
102(E)-that agencies "lend appropriate support to initiatives,
resolutions, and programs designed to maximize international cooperation" in environmental protection. Acceptance of the latter interpretation would make section 102(2)(E) the sole NEPA safeguard
against degradation of the international environment. This interpretation, however, is inconsistent with the fact that most of the section
perspective, can be seen to have recognizable adverse environmental consequences
when viewed from the human perspective adopted by the Act.
59. 115 CONG. REC. 40,416 (1969).
60. See F. ANDERSON, supra note 5, at 6.
61. Hearings 011 S. 1075, S. 237, and S. 1752 Before the Senate Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1969) [hereinafter Senate
Hearings].

362

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 74:349

102(2) subsections supplement each other and do not stand as independent provisions. For example, the section 102(2)(D) directive
to develop appropriate alternatives for unresolved conflicts in resource use would clearly not free the acting agency from the section
102(2)(C) requirement that alternatives be analyzed in the impact
statement. Similarly, the section 102(2)(A) mandate to "utilize a
systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure an integrated
use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design
arts in planning and in decision-making which may have an impact
on man's environment" would not relieve an agency from its responsibility to utilize this same approach in the preparation of the
section 102(2)(C) impact statement. Thus, the fact that section
102(2)(E) specifically focuses on the worldwide environmental
problem does not indicate that Congress intended international
cooperation to be the sole device for safeguarding the worldwide environment.
In fact, further analysis of section 102(2)(E) supports the
conclusion that Congress intended federal agencies to recognize the
"worldwide character" of environmental problems in the implementation of all section 102(2) procedures. Section 102(2)(E) directs
federal agencies to recognize both "the worldwide and long-range
character of environmental problems," and this phrase must be considered as a whole. The question is therefore whether Congress
intended section 102(2)(E) to be the exclusive procedure for the
consideration of both long-range and worldwide aspects of environmental protection or whether it intended both aspects to be considered in all NEPA procedures. Although Congress did not specifically articulate its concern elsewhere in section 102(2), 02 there can
be no doubt that it intended long-range environmental impacts to be
considered in all the section 102(2) procedures. 63 Therefore, in
order to interpret consistently the "worldwide and long-range"
phrase, it should be concluded that the section 102(2)(E) mandate
to recognize the worldwide character of environmental problems was
also intended to apply to all the NEPA procedures; 0·1 the inter62. Section 102(2) (C) (iv) refers only to the "enhancement of long-term productivity" and does not specifically refer to the more general problem of Jong-range
environmental degradation.
63. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 91-296, supra note 4, at 8 (''S. 1075 is also designed to
deal with the long-range implications of many of the critical environmental problems
which have caused great public concern in recent years").
64. It has also been argued: "It would be manifestly illogical to conclude that
Congress on the one hand intended the impact statement requirement of § 102(2) (C)
to apply where the environmental effects occurred abroad and, on the other hand,
made no provision for circulation to, and comment by, foreign governments, the very
authorities which would be most knowledgeable about their respective environments
and most concerned about potential impacts." Intervenors-Defendants Memorandum
of Points of Law and Authorities in Opposition to Paragraph (e) of Plaintiffs CrossMotion For Summary Judgment at 7, Sierra Club v. AEC, 4 ENV. L. REP. 20,685
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national cooperation provision should thus be viewed as merely an
additional procedure for ensuring worldwide environmental protection.
From the above, it seems likely that Congress intended the
"human environment" phrase of section 102(2)(C) to extend
beyond the territorial limits of the United States. The fact that Congress used the more explicit phrase "mankind's world environment"
in section 102(2)(E) should not preclude this construction. 65 First,
section 102(2)(E) expressly deals with environmental degradation
on a worldwide scale, so it is not unusual that this is reemphasized
by speaking in terms of the world environment. Second, the meaning of section 102(2)(C) would clearly be different if it required a
significant effect upon "the quality of the world environment" as a
precondition to the impact statement requirement since this would
arguably exempt any actions having only local effects.
The other section 102(2) subsections also support this construction of "human environment" in section 102(2)(C). These subsections in part require all agencies to develop methods and procedures to ensure that environmental factors are considered in their
decision-making, 66 to study and develop alternatives to unresolved
conflicts of resource use in their activities, 67 and to utilize environmental information in the development of •:resource-oriented" projects. 68 Since it has already been concluded that all federal agen(D.D.C. Aug. 3, 1974). The fact that Congress did not specifically provide in
section 102(2) (C) for such circulation to, and comment by, foreign governments is
immaterial for two reasons: First, to the extent that the comment provision requires
"any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to
any environmental impact involved" to comment, it is clear that Congress could not
have similarly required input from foreign governments. Second, since the Council
on Environmental Quality's guidelines for compliance with NEPA require "a copy of
the draft statement . . . in all cases [to] be sent to any applicant whose project is the
subject of the statement," 40 C.F.R. § 1500.7(a) (1974), foreign governments would
have the same opportunity for comment that other applicants have.
65. An analogous argument is that, since the section 102(2) (E) provision for
international cooperation is qualified with "where consistent with the foreign policy
of the United States," Congress would have similarly qualified section 102(2) (C) if it
had intended that section to apply to federal environmental impacts abroad. However, this argument is not persuasive. The qualification was included only in the
clause of section 102(2) (E) that directs federal agencies to lend appropriate support
to international environmental cooperation. Because that provision is an actual
foreign-policy directive, Congress obviously wanted the agencies to retain some
discretion over the matter. In contrast, since section 102(2) (C) is merely procedural, and at most would influence an agency in a foreign-policy decision, see text at
notes 146-47 infra, there was no need for a foreign-policy qualification in section
102(2)(C).
66. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2) (B) (1970).
67. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(2) (D), 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(0) (1970).
68. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(2)(G), 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(0) (1970).
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cies must comply with these procedures, 00 and because none of these
procedures contain qualifiers (such as "human environment") that
could be interpreted as territorial limitations, 70 these procedures indicate that environmental considerations were intended to be important aspects in the planning of federal activities abroad as well as
within the United States. In light of this conclusion, it is reasonable
to infer that Congress intended "human environment" in section
102(2)(C) ~o mean the environment of all man. This interpretation would merely make the scope of section 102(2)(C) co-extensive with that of the rest of section 102(2).
The statement of general purpose in section 2 also supports a
broad interpretation of the territorial scope of the impact statement
requirement. It expresses Congress' intent "to promote efforts
which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man" and to encourage "harmony between man and his environment." This statement
aids an extraterritorial construction in two respects. First, "biosphere" refers to the relatively thin layer surrounding the earth in
which life exists. 71 A stated congressional purpose is thus to prevent
or eliminate damage to the earth's environment and it would therefore be unreasonable, in the absence of serious countervailing policies, to assume that Congress intended to limit its extraterritorial efforts to the mere support of international cooperation. Since it had
the opportunity to make a significant environmental contribution by
requiring federal agencies abroad to assess the environmental
impacts of their activities, it is likely that Congress intended to do
so. Second, the word "man" is generally used to refer to the whole
human race; unlike the use of "human" to give subjective content
to "environment" in section 102(2)(C),72 the phrase "man and his
environment" implies that Congress was concerned with the environment of all man. 73 This literal interpretation of "man" thus supports
an extraterritorial construction of "human environment" in section
102(2)(C).
Finally, the numerous specific references to Americans and the
nation throughout NEPA, 74 which make the Act appear domestically
oriented, are not necessarily inconsistent with an expansive interpre69. See text at notes 45-56 supra.
70. Section 102(2)(A) uses "man's environment" in much the same way section
102(2)(C) uses "human environment" and thus is subject to similar territorial
ambiguity.
71. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 219 ( 1971).
72. See text at notes 58-64 supra.
73. See also National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. §
433l(a) (1970).
74. See, e.g., §§ l0l(a), 102(b)(2), 202, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331(a), 4332(b)(2),
4342 (1970).
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tation of "human environment." Wherever such statements appear
they are accompanied by broadly worded statements that speak generally of man and the environment. For example, although section
101 (a) 75 speaks of "fulfill[ing] the social, economic, and other
requirements of the present and future generations of Americans,"
it also states that it is the federal policy "to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony." Similarly, while section 101 (b )(2) specifically speaks of
"assur[ing] for all Americans safe, healthful, productive and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings," section 101 (b )( 1)
declares that the United States should "fulfill the responsibilities of
each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations," and section 101(b)(3) directs the nation to "attain the widest
range of the beneficial uses of the environment without degradation,
risk ,to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences." Furthermore, despite the domestically oriented appearance of the requirements of the. mandated section 201 annual
Environmental Quality Report, section 201 ( 4) 76 requires a general
review of federal programs and activities "with particular reference
to their effect on the environment and on the conservation, development and utilization of natural resources." This review is not expressly limited to effects within the United States, and, in light of the
dependence of this nation on natural resources from other countries,
it would be reasonable to interpret this section as applying to effects
on resources worldwide.
Although Congress' foremost concern was certainly with the domestic environment, a reasonable construction of NEPA as a whole,
especially in view of the express concern for the worldwide environment in section 102(2)(E), is that Congress sought not only to
attain acceptable environmental quality in the United States, but
also to minimize the degradation of the worldwide environment resulting from federal activities abroad. Thus, specific references to
Americans and "the nation" do not vitiate the conclusion that
"human environment" was intended to encompass the worldwide
environment and that section 102(2) (C) should, therefore, be applied to the activities of federal agencies abroad.
2.

Legislative History

The legislative history of NEPA, despite its dearth of commentary on the issue of extraterritoriality, also supports this construction
of the section 102(2)(C) impact statement requirement. Although
the need for a comprehensive national environmental policy had long
75. 42 U.S.C.
76. 42 u.s.c.

§
§

4331(a) (1970).
4341(4) (1970).
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been recognized by Congress, 77 it was not until 1968 that Congress
seriously attempted to formulate such a policy. In that year, a joint
House-Senate colloquium was convened to articulate the elements
of a national policy; the results of the colloquium were analyzed in
the Congressional White Paper on a National Policy for the Environment. 78 The White Paper begins with a summary of the colloquium,
a significant portion of which focused on the "[i]nternational aspects
of environmental alteration," and notes that testimony was given
underscoring the "urgent necessity of taking in account major environmental influences of foreign economic assistance and other international developments." 70 Significantly, the statement of national
environmental policy proposed by the White Paper declares:
Environmental quality and productivity shall be considered in a
worldwide context, extending in time from the present to the longterm future.
The requirement to maintain and enhance long-term productivity
and quality of the environment takes precedence over local, shortterm usage. This policy recognizes the responsibility to future generations of those presently controlling the development of natural resources and the modification of the living landscape. Although the
influence of the U.S. policy will be limited outside of its own borders,
the global character of ecological relationships must be the guide for
domestic activities. Ecological considerations should be infused into
all international relations. 80

The legislative history of the bills that directly contributed to the
final form of NEPA81 is not, however, comparably clear on this issue.
Since most of title I of NEPA, including section 102, came directly
from the Senate bill (S. 107 5), the Senate hearings and report are
likely to be accorded the greatest weight in interpreting section
102(2)(C). However, because S. 1075 was extensively redrafted
after the hearings to include the present declaration of national
environmental policy and the section 102(2) procedures, the hearings are not entirely apposite. In its original form, S. 1075, "A BILL
to authorize . . . investigations . . . and research relating to the
Nation's ecological systems, natural resources, and environmental
71. See 115 CoNG. REc. 29,067 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson).
78. The White Paper was introduced into the records of the debates on NEPA by
Senator Jackson on Oct. 8, 1969. 115 CONG. REC. 29,078 (1969).
19. Id. at 29,079.
80. Id. at 29,081-82.
81. The final wording of NEPA was drawn up in a joint Senate-House conference, which combined independent Senate and House bills. See Conference Report,
supra note 46. Most of NEPA came directly from the Senate bill, S. 1075, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). The conference committee inserted as NEPA section
l0l(a) the declaration of environmental policy in the House bill, H.R. 12549, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), and left the Senate statement of policy in as section 101 (b ).
All other title I sections are from S. 1075; most of title II is from H.R. 12549.
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quality . . .," 82 was largely directed toward the environmental problems of the United States. It has been suggested that the scope of
the original bill may have been intentionally limited by Senator Jackson in order to ensure that his own Interior and Insular Affairs
Committee would have jurisdiction.83
In light of the White Paper's express concern for the worldwide
environment, it is surprising that little attention was accorded to the
limited territorial scope of S. 1075 during the Senate hearings.
Nevertheless, Dr. Lynton K. Caldwell stated:
The term "environment" includes the life-support system of our
nation and all the earth-the system of interactions of people with
the air, water, land, and living organisms that comprise the biosphere-the interactions of those elements in our world capable of
sustaining life. And although our immediate concern is with environmental policy in America, that policy must permit our nation to play
a constructive role in international efforts to safeguard a biosphere
of the whole earth. For this sphere of life . . . is an ecological unity.
All men, together with all other living things, depend on its selfrenewing capabilities for their continuing existence. 84
Similarly, the Department of State, in its statement, recommended
that the bill should recognize that
1. The deterioration of the national environment is part of a
global process and thus requires remedial action on an international as well as a national scale.
2. Study, review and research must, therefore, be extended to
take into account problems . . . beyond national borders.
3.

The solution of the environmental problem being a matter of
national interest as well as of international concern, U.S. participation in bilateral and multilateral programs dealing with
the international aspects of the problem must be recognized
as a vital part of U.S. policy to cope with environmental
problems. 85
Section 102 (including section 102(2)(E) ) was added to the
bill following these hearings. Unfortunately, the legislative history
does not indicate precisely what was intended by the addition. The
statement accompanying the amended bill86 did not state whether
the international cooperation provision of section 102(2)(E) was
intended to be the sole protection for the international environment,
thus specifically following the State Department's third recommendation, or whether in response to the general policies articulated in the
82. Senate Hearings, supra note 61, at 1. See also id. at 21.
83. F. ANDERSON, supra note 5, at 5.
84. Senate Hearings, supra note 61, at 128.
85. Id. at 10 (statement of W. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for
Congressional Relations).
86. Id, at 205-06.
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hearings, all of section 102(2) was intended to minimize degradation of the international environment. It is significant, however, that
the amendments removed the prior emphasis on the national environment. For example, the original title of S. 1075 authorized
studies, surveys, and research "relating to the Nation's ecological systems, natural resources, and environmental quality." 87 In contrast,
the amended title of S. 1075 authorized such studies "relating to
ecological systems, natural resources, and the quality of the human
environment." 88 Although the conference committee abbreviated
this clause of the amended title to "other purposes," it is significant
that the de-emphasis on the domestic orientation of the bill was
accompanied by the inclusion of the term "human environment" in
the title, as well as in section 102(2)(C). Thus, a reasonable inference is that "human environment" was intended to connote the
worldwide environment.
Although the Senate report was prepared after the extensive
amendments to S. 1075, it too fails to address the issue of the territorial scope of section 102(2)(C). For the most part, the section
102(2) provisions are merely restated; little amplification on their
meaning is provided. 80 Nevertheless, the report does provide some
additional insight relevant to the issue. There are a number of
specific references in the Senate report to the environment of the
nation. However, as with the statutory language itself, there are also
numerous statements in the Senate report that support the interpretation that Congress intended both to attain acceptable environmental quality in the United States and to help protect the world
environment, not only through bilateral cooperation, but also by
minimizing the deleterious effects of federal activities abroad. For
example, it states:
Important decisions concerning the use and shape of man's future
environment continue to be made in small but steady increments
which perpetuate rather than avoid the recognized mistakes of
previous decades. . . . The ultimate issue posed by short-sighted,
conflicting, and often selfish demands and pressures upon the finite
resources of the earth are clear. As a nation and as a world, we
face these conditions: ... a growing technological power which is far
outstripping man's capacity to understand and ability to control its
impact on the environment.
The committee believes that America's capacity as a nation to
confront these conditions . . . can be improved and broadened if
Congress clarifies the goals, concepts, and procedures which determine and guide the programs and activities of Federal agencies. 00
81.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 206 (emphasis added).
Id. at 207 (emphasis added).
See S. REP. No. 91-296, supra note 4, at 19-21.
Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added).
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The conditions described in the first paragraph of this statement
are expressly not confined to the United States, and a reasonable
interpretation is that "America's capacity as a nation to confront these
conditions" was intended to extend to all federal activities, including
those not within the territorial United States. Significantly, this
statement specifically suggests that "procedures . . . [to] guide the
programs and activities of Federal agencies" be utilized as a means
of confronting worldwide environmental problems. The report also
states that "[i]n seeking intensified beneficial utilization of the
earth's resources, the Federal Government must take care to avoid
degradation and misuse of resources, risk to man's continued health
and safety, and other undesirable and unintended consequences" 91
and that "the survival of man, in a world in which decency and dignity are possible, is the basic reason for bringing man's impact on
his environment under informed and responsible control." 92 Such
statements directly support the interpretation that Congress intended
section 102(2) (C) to be applied to federal activities worldwide.
The legislative history in the House is also relevant to the issue
of the territorial scope of section 102(2)(C). Although the House
bill (H.R. 12549) did not include "action forcing" procedures such
as section 102(2), it did contribute to NEPA the section 10~
statement of national environmental policy and most of title II, and,
as suggested earlier, a broad interpretation of these sections supports
the worldwide scope of section 102(2)(C).03
Several statements in the House hearings indicate that such an
interpretation of these sections is warranted. For exampJe, Margaret
Mead emphasized that environmental problems "are planetary and
the larger the framework with which we can deal with the better.
Any discussion has to include the fact that these problems are international. . . . We are exporting insecticides and fertilizers to other
countries and setting up in other countries technological problems
that are giving them a great deal of trouble." 94 Moreover, later testimony concerning problems that the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) should confront focused on a number of worldwide
problems, including the long-term effects of pesticides, the effects
of an increasing accumulation of radioactive wastes, and the increase
in the worldwide percentage of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.95
91. Id. at 18.
92. Id. at 19.
93. See text at notes 74-76 supra.
94. Hearings on H.R. 6750, H.R. 11886, H.R. 11942, H.R. 12077, H.R. 12180,
H.R. 12207, H.R. 12209, H.R. 12228, H.R. 12264, and H.R. 12409 Before the
Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House Comm. on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1969).
95. See, e.g., id. at 152 (statement of R. Macmullan, Director, Michigan Department of Natural Resources); id. at 116-21 (statement of Sierra Club).
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The House report on H.R. 12549 reemphasized these points:
"The testimony at the hearing also stressed the importance of the
international aspects of the environmental problem. It is an unfortunate fact that many and perhaps most forms of environmental
pollution cross international boundaries as easily as they cross State
lines. . . . The international aspects are clearly a major part of the
questions which the Council would have to confront . . . ." 00 In
addition, its discussion of the requirement of an annual environmental Quality Report, 07 the House report states: "Implicit in this section
is the understanding that the international implications of our current
activities will also be considered, inseparable as they are from the
purely national consequences of our actions." 08 Significantly, this
statement does not restrict the territorial scope of "current activities."
Thus, in order to consider fully these "international implications,"
"current activities" should be interpreted to include federal programs
and activities abroad. Although the House bill did not contain a provision comparable to the impact statement requirement of section
102(2) (C), the intention that NEPA's section 102(2) (C) be viewed
as an additional means to evaluate federal activities abroad can be
inferred from the fact that the House intended the CEQ to review
and appraise federal actions abroad.
The report00 of the conference committee from which NEPA
finally emerged also failed to address the issue of section 102(2) (C)'s
territorial scope. The remarks of Senator Jackson in submitting
the conference committee report to the Senate do, however, provide strong evidence of an intention to apply the NEPA procedures
to the activities of federal agencies abroad: "What is involved
is a congressional declaration that we do not intend, as a government or as a people, to initiate actions which endanger the con•
tinued existence or the health of mankind: That we will not
intentionally initiate actions which will do irreparable damage to the
air, land, and water which support life on earth." 100 It is evident
that compliance with the procedures of section 102(2), particularly
section 102(2)(C) can be inferred from Senator Jackson's later
statement identifying "human environment" with "man's life support
system."101
In conclusion, although the legislative history is not conclusive
evidence of a congressional intention to apply section 102(2)(C)
extraterritorially, it does demonstrate clearly that Congress was con96. H.R. REP. No. 91-378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1969).
97. This requirement appears in NEPA as section 201, 42 U.S.C.
98. H.R. REP. No. 91-378, supra note 96, at 9.
99. Conference Report, supra note 46.
100. 115 CoNG. REC. 40,416 (1969),
101. 115 CONG. R.Ec. 40,417 (1969).

§

4341 (1970).
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cerned with the environmental problem on a worldwide as well as
on a national scale. The dearth of legislative history specifically concerning the territorial scope of section I 02(2)(C) probably results
from the fact that Congress failed to consider this precise question
at all. Nevertheless, there are specific indications in each stage of
the legislative history that support the interpretation of "human
environment" in section 102(2)(C) as the environment of all man.
Thus, a reasonable conclusion is that Congress would have intended
section I 02(2)(C) to apply to federal activities worldwide if it had
actually considered the issue.
This conclusion is supported by the results of the subsequent
oversight hearings on NEPA, held in December 1970, by the House
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. During those hearings, a representative of the Department of State directly confronted
the committee with the issue of section 102(2) (C)'s territorial scope
by arguing that the impact statement requirement should not apply to
federal actions within the jurisdiction of another country.102 The committee, however, flatly rejected this argument: "The Department of
State, in consultation with CEQ, should reconsider its position that
AID supported projects need not be accompanied by '102' statements.
Such a position is contrary to both the language and to the intent of
NEPA." 103 The committee report concluded: "Stated most charitably, the committee disagrees with this interpretation of NEPA.
The history of the Act makes it quite clear that the global effects
of environmental decisions are inevitably a part of the decision-making process and must be considered in that context."104 Although
these subsequent oversight hearings are not part of NEPA's legislative history, they are nevertheless relevant to the interpretation of
its territorial scope, particularly since this is probably the first time
that Congress actually confronted the issue.

C.

Administrative and Judicial Interpretation

Further support for this interpretation of extraterritorial scope of
section 102(2) (C) is provided by the CEQ's position on the issue.
In its August 1973 revised guidelines, issued to assist federal agencies in complying with NEPA procedures, the CEQ directed that
agencies should "assess the positive and negative effects of the
proposed action as it affects both the national and international
environment." 105 Although this statement could be interpreted as
referring only to the international impacts of federal actions within
102. See Oversight Hearings, supra note 8, pt. 2, at 546-57 (memorandum of C.
Herter, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, State Department).
103. H.R. REP. No. 92-316, supra note 13, at 6.
104. Id. at 33 (emphasis omitted).
105. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.8(a)(3)(i) (1974).
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the United States, the CEQ has requested impact statements on federal activities abroad. 106 Moreover, a resolution by the CEQ's
Legal Advisory Committee states: "[11he language and legislative
history of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the law
of the United States, and the administrative procedures of the Council on Environmental Quality support the conclusion that § 102(2)
(C) does apply to State and AID actions carried out within the
territorial jurisdiction of another nation . . . ." 107 Although CEQ's
position on such matters is not conclusive, it has been accorded great
weight by the courts. One court has stated that "[s]uch adminisstrative interpretation cannot be ignored except for the strongest
reasons, particularly where the interpretation is a construction of a
statute by the men designated by the statute to put it into effect."108
Although no court has yet ruled directly on the applicability of
section 102(2)(C) to the international activities of federal agencies, 109 several cases have addressed aspects of this territorial issue.
People of Enewetak v. Laird110 involved NEPA's application to the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, which, although not part of the
territorial United States, is exclusively governed by the United
States. 111 The court held that NEPA, including the section 102(2)
procedures, did extend to these islands. 112 It based its conclusion,
however, largely on the fact that "Nation" rather than "United
States" was used throughout the Act: It interpreted this usage as
evidence of a congressional intent that the Act apply to all United
States possessions as well as to the territorial United States. Although the court expressly avoided considering whether section
102(2) (C) applies to federal activities worldwide, 113 it did recognize that "NEPA is framed in expansive language that clearly evidences a concern for all persons subject to federal action which has
a major impact on their environment-not merely United States'
106. See Speech by R. Train, Chairman, CEQ, 102 MONITOR, Feb. 1973, at 1, 8.
107. Legal Advisory Comm., Report to the President's Council on Environmental
Quality 14, Dec. 1971.
108. Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 339 F. Supp.
806, 811 (E.D. Tenn.), atfd., 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972), stay denied, 414 U.S.
1036 (1973).
109. In Sierra Club v. Coleman, Civ. No. 75-1040 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 1975),
NEPA was invoked to halt federal agency activity in Panama. The opinion of the
court, however, did not address the issue of extraterritorial applicability. See note 9
supra.
110. 353 F. Supp. 811 (D. Hawaii 1973).
111. See 353 F. Supp. at 818-19.
112. In People of Saipan v. Department of Interior, 356 F. Supp. 645 (D. Hawaii
1973), modified on other grounds sub nom. People of Saipan ex rel. Guerrero v.
Department of Interior, 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003
(1975), the district court reaffirmed its position that NEPA applies to the Trust
Territories.
113. 353 F. Supp. at 817 n.10.
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citizens located in the fifty states." 114 The court further noted that
NEPA's legislative history fully supports such a broad interpretation
of the Act's scope and "demonstrates that Congress clearly recognized that environmental problems are worldwide in scope [and]
was therefore particularly concerned about the international implications of United States actions that affect the human environment."115
A second case that supports an extraterritorial interpretation of
section 102(2) (C) is Wilderness Society v. Morton,1 16 in which
certain Canadians moved to intervene in NEPA litigation challenging
the adequacy of the impact statement for the Alaskan pipeline on
the ground that the people and the environment of Canada would
not be satisfactorily represented by existing plaintiffs' counsel. Although the opinion is brief and does not discuss the scope of section
102(2)(C), a necessary implication of the court's granting of the
motion is that the plaintiff-foreigners had been conferred some rights
by NEPA. 117 The case thus directly supports the interpretation of
"human environment" in section 102(2)(C) as the environment of
all man.11 8

D.

Policy Considerations

Although the statutory language, legislative history, and extant
administrative and judicial interpretations of NEPA all support an
extraterritorial interpretation of section 102(2)(C)'s scope, ultimate
resolution of this issue requires an analysis of the countervailing
policy considerations. Opponents of an extraterritorial construction
of section 102(2)(C) ,have contended that it will result in substantial
practical difficulties for federal agencies functioning abroad and thus
will interfere with the implementation of United States foreign
policy. Eximbank has argued that section 102(2)(C)'s disclosure
requirements would frustrate foreign government demands for confidence of negotiations 110 and that the quick, decisive action often
necessary for successful international negotiations would not be
possible within the NEPA framework. 120 It has emphasized that the
114. 353 F. Supp. at 816.
115. 353 F. Supp. at 817.
116. 463 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
111. See People of Eneweta-k v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811, 818 (D. Hawaii 1973)
("Wilderness Society seems to hold that NEPA provides foreign nationals with
certain rights when their environment is endangered by federal actions").
118. However, because the proposed federal action was to take place within the
United States, Wilderness Society does not necessarily support the interpretation that
agencies acting within the jurisdiction of another country must comply with section
102(2)(C).
119. ~ee Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of Defendant Export-Import
Bank of the United States at 7; Sierra Club v. AEC, 4 ENV. L. REP. 20,685 (D.D.C.
Aug. 3, 1974).
120. See id.
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United States is in competition with other governments for foreign
markets and has claimed that the delay inherent in NEPA procedures and the uncertainty whether Eximbank commitments will withstand judicial scrutiny would put the agency at a great competitive
disadvantage. 121
The need for confidentiality of military and diplomatic secrets
should not present a significant problem. Such secrets need not be
released to the public in an impact statement, even if they are
directly relevant to environmental considerations. Section 102
(2)(C) itself grants an exemption for these secrets by requiring the
release of statements to the public pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 122 which expressly exempts the release of information that "(A) [isJ specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
national defense or foreign policy and (B) [is] in fact properly
classified pursuant to such Executive order." 123 As a practical
matter, such confidential information is usually omitted from impact
statements to enable its distribution to the public. For example,
despite the fact that some military and diplomatic secrets were
involved in the underground nuclear blast on Amchitka Island, the
military simply omitted these from the impact statement and then
released it for public inspection and comment. 124 Where the FOIA
does not exempt information from disclosure, but where it is nevertheless in the interest of the United States to maintain the confidentiality of a negotiation position, the agency involved could still
satisfy the objectives of section 102(2)(C) by merely stating the
environmental impacts of all alternatives without revealing favored
positions. This approach has been utilized by the Department of
State in releasing impact statements on the negotiations of international agreements. 125
The practical difficulty of the delay inherent in the preparation
of section 102(2)(C) impact statements, which could interfere with
the functioning of federal agencies in the international sphere,
presents a somewhat more difficult problem. The CEQ guidelines
require that a minimum of ninety days must elapse between prepara121. See Eximbank's Opposition, supra note 8, at 10-11.
122. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), as amended, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (Supp. Feb. 1975).
123. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(l) (Supp. Feb. 1975). See generally Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REV. 971, 1047-50 (1975).
124. See Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788, 791
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
125. The Department of State regulations for compliance with NEPA state that
"[w]here appropriate, a draft statement may be prepared prior to the establishment of
a U.S. position, indicating that two or more alternatives are under consideration
without specifying the Department's preference." 37 Fed. Reg. 19,168 (1972). Cf.
40 C.F.R. § 1500.7(a) (1975) (CEQ Guidelines).
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tion of the draft impact statement126 and commencement of the
action. 127 However, they also provide:
Where emergency circumstances make it necessary to take an action
with significant environmental impact without observing the provisions of ·these guidelines concerning minimum periods for agency review and advance availability of environmental statements, the Federal agency proposing to take the action should consult with the
Council about alternative arrangements. Similarly where there are
overriding considerations of expense to the Government or impaired
program effectiveness, the responsible agency should consult with the
Council concerning appropriate modifications of the minimum periods.12s

This provision indicates that the CEQ can be responsive to the
difficulties of NEPA compliance and will grant a reduction of the
minimum period under appropriate circumstances. A comment by
the three-judge district court in Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures (SCRAP) v. United States, 129 indicates that the
courts too may be responsive to this problem: "We might look with
sympathy, for example, on some modifications in the time requirements for draft impact statements and comments contained in the
CEQ Guidelines so as to better accommodate them to the fast-moving
suspension process." 130
In certain situations, however, even if the waiting period is
shortened, the burden and delay of preparing an adequate impact
statement may still interfere materially with the activities of a federal
agency abroad. 131 An example of such a situation would be an international negotiation with a significant environmental impact, where
time restraints make preparation of an impact statement infeasible.
In such a case, the policy argument against application of NEPA procedures would be very strong if no resolution of this conflict were
possible.
126. The CEQ has interpreted the circulation and comment provision of section
102(2)(C) as requiring the preparation of a draft environmental statement to be
made available for public comment as well as comment by other agencies. 40 C.F.R.
§§ 1500.7, .11 (1975).
127. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.ll(b) (1975).
128. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.11 (e) (1975).
129. 346 F. Supp. 189 (D.D.C. 1972), revd. on other grounds, 412 U.S. 669
(1973 ).
130. 346 F. Supp. at 199 n.12.
131. One method by which this burden could be minimized would be the use of
statements outlining a general program. In practice, many activities by federal
agencies abroad are part of an ongoing program, such as providing pesticides and
fertilizers to nations in need, or the exporting of nuclear power plants. Wherever
such a program is involved, a programmatic impact statement could be prepared
describing the generalities of the program. Much briefer and less complex impact
statements, dealing only with matters particular to each action, could then be
prepared for individual actions.
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The courts have strictly construed the "to the fullest extent
possible" qualification in the section 102(2) mandate and have held
that mere "[c]onsiderations of administrative difficulty, delay or
economic cost will not suffice to strip [section 102] of its fundamental importance."132 Nevertheless, the courts have exempted federal
agencies from NEPA's procedural requirements where "the existing
law applicable to such agen[cies'] operations . . . makes full compliance . . . impossible."133 In Cohen v. Price Commission, 134 the
plaintiff sought to have a commission-approved price increase enjoined because the agency had failed to comply with NEPA's procedures. In refusing to issue a preliminary injunction, the district
court stated:
[A] fair reading of the provisions of NEPA and the Economic
Stabilization Act, and their respective basic purposes indicates a substantial question as to whether NEPA is applicable to the Price
Commission-a temporary agency and one intended to act upon
matters within its authority with dispatch-whose function would
readily be defeated and frustrated by bureaucratic delays were it
required to [comply with NEPA's procedures]. 135

Similarly, in the more recent case of Gulf Oil Corp. v. Simon, 136 the
District Court for the District of Columbia applied the Cohen
rationale to hold that the Federal Energy Office (FEO) was not
required to prepare an environmental impact statement on regulations promulgated pursuant to the Emergency Petroleum Allocation
Act of 1973: 137 "[It is] abundantly clear that Congress had intended
the FEO administrator to proceed expeditiously. Compliance with
NEPA, on the other hand, would disarm the FEO of its ability and
authority to take necessary action with the required degree of
speed."138 Finally, two cases involving challenges to the ICC's failure to prepare an impact statement for proposed rate increases support the proposition that impossibility of compliance can be grounds
for exemption from NEPA's procedures. In Port of New York
Authority v. United States, 130 the Second Circuit indicated that,
because of the nature of the challenged proceedings, preparation of
an impact statement should not be required: "The detailed evaluation of benefits and costs required by NEPA is not possible at the
132. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C,
Cir. 1971).
133. Conference Report, supra note 46, at 9.
134. 337 F. Supp. 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
135. 337 F. Supp. at 1241.
136. 373 F. Supp. 1102 (D.D.C. 1974).
137. 15 U.S.C. §§ 151-56 (Supp. III, 1973 ), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. §
753(g)(l) (Supp. Feb. 1975), as amended, Emergency Petroleum Act of 1975, Pub.
L. No. 94-99, 89 Stat. 481.
138. 373 F. Supp. at 1105.
139. 451 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1971),
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stage of the review of the lawfulness of proposed tariffs under focus
here. . . . [Suspension proceedings] are simply not amenable to
the careful balancing analysis required by NEPA." 140 Although in
SCRAP, a different conclusion was reached as to whether the nature
of such proceedings precluded compliance with NEPA's mandate,
the three-judge district court acknowledged that the appropriate
approach to the issue of exemptions from NEPA's procedural
requirements is to determine whether compliance is in fact impossible.141 Thus, to the extent that the NEPA procedural duties
irreconcilably conflict with the proper functioning of a federal agency
in its international activities, the courts may be willing to exempt
such activities from the impact statement requirement of section
102(2)(C).

Furthermore, the concern that NEPA might deprive federal agencies acting abroad of the authority to make binding commitments
( due to the possibility of subsequent injunction) does not appear
warranted. As concluded earlier,142 the substantive mandate of
NEPA would not compel agencies to reach particular decisions
concerning their activities abroad. Thus, such agency actions
would, under NEPA, be subject to review or injunction by the
courts only on the ground of noncompliance with the section
102(2) procedures. Moreover, because of the general judicial reluctance to evaluate foreign policy objectives, a court might hesitate
to enjoin agency actions abroad even in this situation. Such judicial
hesistancy in the NEPA context is evidenced by Committee for
Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 143 in which the court, because of
the significant weight it attributed to the government's "assertions of
potential harm to national security and foreign policy," 144 refused to
enjoin the impending nuclear test. Thus, even if a court determines
that the impact statement for a foreign commitment is not entirely
adequate, it might well refuse to enjoin the prospective action, at
least if the agency had made a "good faith" effort to comply fully
with NEPA. 145
140. 451 F.2d at 789-90.
141. 346 F. Supp. 189, 199 (D.D.C. 1972). In reversing the district court
decision, the Supreme Court expressly refrained from deciding this issue. United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S.
669, 698 n.12 (1973).
142. See text at and following notes 20-21 supra.
143. 463 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir.), application for injunction in aid of jurisdiction
denied sub nom. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Schlesinger, 404 U.S. 917
(1971).
144. 463 F.2d at 798.
145. However, as the Seaborg court emphasized, a court's refusal to enjoin an
agency's actions does not release the agency from its obligation to prepare an
environmental impact statement, even after the action has been completed: "Whatever
the consequences of the [action], its mere occurrence will not moot the issue of the
Government's compliance with laws designed to insure that environmental factors
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In summary, NEPA can adequately accommodate the special
· requirements of agencies acting abroad. The need for confidentiality of certain matters and the necessity for expeditious action can
be fully respected. Agencies acting abroad would only be subject
to injunction for failure to comply with NEPA's procedures, and even
this interference with their functioning would probably occur only
when the agency had made less than a full disclosure of environmental considerations.
A final policy argument against an expansive interpretation of
the territorial scope of NEPA is that other nations might view it as
an imposition of our environmental standards and thus resent it as
"environmental imperialism." The extension of NEPA's procedures
to federal agencies abroad, however, would in no way affect the ultimate decision-making authority of the agency. 140 Although United
States assistance might be denied or conditioned upon grounds of
environmental protection, this would only be the result of the
inherent discretionary powers of the agency. The purpose of the
NEPA procedures, and section 102(2)(C) in particular, is to ensure
the recognition of environmental consequences during the federal
decision-making process. 147 This information would be as useful to
the foreign country involved as to the participating federal agency
in deciding whether a particular action should be undertaken. Considering the effort and expense involved in many of the federal
activities abroad, it is only reasonable to provide both the federal
agency and the foreign nation involved with the opportunity to maximize the over-all benefits of a proposed project by facilitating their
consideration of environmental as well as economic and technical factors in the decision-making process. As illustrated by the problems
resulting from the Aswan High Dam, 148 a sound understanding of
possible environmental consequences is important even if the recipient country puts a much higher priority on economic development
than environmental protection. Finally, even if an agency decision
is adverse to the desires of the foreign nation involved, such a decision would necessarily be based upon a determination by the agency
involved in a decision of this magnitude are considered and set forth fully and
candidly, pursuant to the Congressional mandate, for the information of the executive
and legislative branches and the public." 463 F.2d at 799. See also Aberdeen &
Rockfish R.R. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 43 U.S.L.W.
4844 (U.S. June 24, 1975).
146. See text at notes 17-21 supra.
147. Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1091 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
148. This Soviet foreign aid project in Egypt has been an ecological disaster.
The dam has cut off the Nile's natural fertilization of the lands below the dam and
the flow of nutrients to the sea, has hurt the fishing industry, and has caused
problems with the fluke parasite in irrigation canals. See L. CALDWELL, IN DEFENSE
OF EARTii 92-93 ( 1972).
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that the international detriment outweighs the local benefit. Clearly
such an exercise of agency discretion is appropriate from a policy
standpoint.
An analysis of the worldwide nature of environmental degradation demonstrates the importance of an extraterritorial interpretation
of the impact statement requirement. No one can doubt the severity
of the present environmental problem and the potential for dr~tic
future consequences. Mankind is depleting important and irreplaceable resources at an incredible and highly wasteful rate149 and is
introducing vast quantities of toxic and nondegradable chemicals
into the environment. 150 It is well recognized that these actions will
ultimately have worldwide effects. 151 Several pollutants, such as
DDT and radioactive wastes, have already spread throughout the
globe and are detectable in life forms everywhere. 152 In addition,
other deleterious effects will likely result in the long run from the
cumulative impact of man's activities. For example, the measurable
increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide over the past few decades
has potential for changing weather patterns worldwide. 153 Similarly,
it is possible that nitrous oxides and other atmospheric pollutants will
ascend to the upper atmosphere and there react with the ozone layer,
which is essential to protect terrestrial life from the sun's lethal ultraviolet rays. rn 4 The effects of ozone loss would necessarily be worldwide.
These examples illustrate the simple fact of the symbiotic nature
of all aspects of the environment. A change in one element anywhere can have multiple effects throughout the whole earth system.
As Senator Jackson has stated: "We must seek solutions to environmental problems on an international level because they are international in origin and scope. The earth is a common resource, and
cooperative effort will be necessary to protect it." 155 Since man has
not yet begun to understand the complexity of the entire system, it
would be fallacious to presume that a distinction could presently be
drawn between environmental impacts that are strictly local and
those that have potential for long-range worldwide damage. The
only prudent course is for man to minimize his direct impact on
natural systems in whatever he does and wherever he acts.
149. See E. GoLDSMlTII, R. ALLEN, M. ALLABY, ]. DAVOLL &
BLUEPRINT FOR SURVIVAL 149-54 (1972).

s.

LAWRENCE,

150. Id. at 91-102.
151. See, e.g., White Paper, supra note 78, 115 CONG. REc. at 29,081-82; B. WARD
& R. Duaos, ONLY ONE EARTH 191-220 (1972).
152. T. DETWYLER, MAN'S IMPACT ON ENVIRONMENT 555, 555-56, 578-79
(1971).
153. See B. WARD & R. Duaos, supra note 151, at 192-94.
154. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1972, at 10, col. 1. Fluorocarbons present in
aerosol sprays may also threaten the ozone layer. See id., Oct. 31, 1974, at 29, col. 1.
155. 115 CONG. REc. 40,417 (1969).
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T,he United States is one of the primary disrupters of natural
systems in the world today. Although most of this disruption occurs
domestically, there is potential for considerable disruption by federal
activities abroad, 156 such as the large-scale use of defoliants in Vietnam and the exportation of nuclear power plants and large quantities of DDT through foreign aid programs. Due to the interrelatedness of all natural systems, it is in the United States' own interest
to apply NEPA procedures, which were designed to minimize the
environmental impacts of federal actions, to these activities abroad.
Thus, from an environmental policy standpoint, NEPA procedures
should be applied to federal activities anywhere in the world.
156. "[A]s the nation with the most highly developed technology in the world,
the United States is responsible for a major share of the adverse impacts of modem
technology upon the quality of the world environment. Our economic development
programs has [sic] produced major environmental impacts in the undeveloped countries, many of them deleterious." Joint House.;Senate Colloquium To Discuss a
National Policy for the Environment, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs and the House Comm. 011 Science and Astronautics, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 220 (1968) (statement of R. Train, President, Conservation Foundation)
(emphasis omitted).

